A complete, recursive axiomatization of a subsystem of Levesque's only-knowing logic is given. The sublogic is obtained by relaxing some of Levesque's semantic conditions while keeping the most important definitions unchanged. The axiom system is obtained by adding an axiom of Humberstone to a subset of the set of Levesque's axioms. The completeness result is proved using the subordination method of Hughes and Cresswell.
Introduction
Levesque introduced a first-order modal logic with a modal operator for "only knowing" in order to allow nonmonotonic reasoning within the language [5] . The truthvalue for the sentence "the agent only knows A" is defined by the condition: "A is true in all and only accessible worlds". "Only knowing" can be defined in terms of two operators: "knowing at least" (truth in all accessible worlds) and "knowing at most" (truth in all inaccessible worlds.) Levesque has given a non-recursive axiom system for his logic, proved its completeness for the unquantified case and conjectured its completeness for first-oder case. However, the conjecture has been shown to be incorrect by Halpern and Lakemeyer [2] .
Levesque is the first to study non-monotonic reasoning using only-knowing, but not the first to propose the study of modal operators whose truth-conditions are defined in terms of inaccessible worlds. It seems, however, that he was unaware of works in mainstream modal logic which have proposed similar operators, but only within a propositional framework and with different motivations. In [4] , Humberstone proposed an elegant axiomatization for the basic propositional modal logic with two modalities very similar to Levesque's operators of "knowing at least" and "knowing at most". Basically, the axiom system consists of two copies of the modal system K, each for one operator, and an axiom schema governing the interaction of the two modal operators.
In the present paper we shall apply Humberstone's method to the first-order case and to a stronger modal logic (namely, K45 rather than K for one modal operator) to axiomatize a subsystem of Levesque's logic. Rather than trying to find a non-recursive axiom system for the full logic, which is not recursively axiomatizable, we shall try to axiomatize a part of it recursively and try to make this axiomatizable part as large as possible. We hope that such a complete axiomatization will shed some light on the first-order logic of only-knowing, which is still not yet well understood. Moreover, the axiom system to be obtained might serve as a basis for a complete (although non-recursive) axiomatization of the full logic. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review briefly Levesque's logic of only-knowing. Next, we define a subsystem of it by modifying the model definition. Then we give an axiom system for the sublogic and prove its soundness and completeness.
A Review of Levesque's Logic

Syntax and Semantics
The language OL is a modal first-order dialect with identity, but without individual constants or function symbols. It is built up from an infinite stock Pred of predicate symbols of every arity, an infinite collection Var of individual variables, a special two-space equality symbol =, and a countably infinite set C of standard names, which are considered (like the equality symbol) to be logical symbols. Formulae are formed in the standard way using the logical connectives ¬, ∧, the existential quantifier ∃, and two unary modal operators B and N. (The other connectives and the universal quantifier ∀ will be used freely as abbreviations.) The operator O of only-knowing is defined as Op = def Bp ∧ N¬p. Formulae without free variables are called sentences.
Our emphasis will be on sentences, and the models we define later only deal with sentences. An atomic sentence is a predicate other than = applied to names. The set of atomic sentences is denoted by Atom. If p is a formula, x a variable, and c a standard name, then p[x := c] denotes the formula we get from p when all free occurrences of x are replaced by c. A sentence is called objective if it does not contain any modal operator, basic if it does not contain the operator N, and subjective if each of its predicates falls within the scope of a modal operator.
The semantics for OL is a variant of the possibleworlds semantics for first-order modal logic. A possible world is identified with a set w ⊆ Atom of atomic sentences, which can be thought of as the set of atomic sentences which are true at that world. We denote the set of all worlds with W0: W0 = Pow(Atom), where Pow(X) denotes the powerset of X, for any X. Note that we are concerned with sentences only, so no variable assignment is needed.
To assign truth-values to sentences containing the operators B and N, a set W ⊆ W0 of accessible possible worlds is considered. The sentence Bp is read: "the agent knows (at least) p" and means truth in all accessible worlds (i.e., all worlds in W): Bp is true if and only if p is true at all worlds that the agent considers possible. The intuitive reading of Np is "the agent knows at most ¬p": Np is true iff p is true at all worlds that the agent does not consider possible, i.e., worlds in W0 \ W. If N¬p is the case then the agent does not know more than p, because if he knew more, then he would not consider possible all the worlds where p is true. Thus, N¬p formalizes the notion that the agent knows at most p. The formula Op is read: "The agent only knows p" or "the agent knows exactly p". According to its definition and the evaluation rules for the operators B and N, Op is true iff p is true at all worlds that the agent considers possible, and only at those worlds. Definition 1. Given a set W of worlds and a world w, the relation (W, w) |= p (read: the pair (W, w) satisfies the sentence p) is defined recursively as follows:
• For any atomic P, (W, w) |= P iff P∈w • (W, w) |= (ni = nj ) iff ni is the same name as nj
According to this definition, it is obvious that subjective sentences do not depend on the w in question, i.e., all worlds are epistemically equal. So if p is subjective then we can write W |= p. Objective sentences do not depend on the W chosen, so we can write and w |= p in case p is objective. We write (W, w) |≠p in case the relation |= does not hold between (W, w) and p.
Some comments on the semantics definition are in order. Levesque's models differ in some ways from the usual semantics for first-order modal languages. First, a subset of the set of possible worlds, that are thought to be accessible from every world, rather than an explicit accessibility relation, is considered. Second, the standard names are rigid designators, denoting the same element of the domain, namely themselves, in every world. Standard names are taken to designate distinctly and exhaustively. Related to this domain restriction is the interpretation of quantification and equality: quantification is interpreted substitutionally, and equality means syntactically equal.
To define validity, Levesque does not consider arbitrary sets of worlds, but only those which are maximal in the following sense: W and W' are equivalent if for every basic sentence p we have (W, w) |= p iff (W', w) |= p. It can be shown that there is a way to extend each set of world to a maximal equivalent one [5] . A sentence p is said to be valid iff (W, w) |= p for all pairs (W, w) where W is maximal.
Axiomatization
Now we review Levesque's axiomatization for the concept of only knowing. It is easy to see that if p is a falsifiable objective sentence then the schema Np → ¬Bp is valid for all pairs (W, w). It follows that the set of all valid sentences is not recursively axiomatizable: if there were a recursive axiomatization of that set, then we could enumerate recursively all falsifiable objective sentences, contrary to the fact that there is no such enumeration. Thus, a complete axiomatization must be non-recursive. Levesque proposed the following non-recursive axiom system. Definition 2. Let L stand for both B and N. Axioms: (A1) All theorems of first-order logic (A2) Lp, where p is a theorem of first-order logic (A3) (n i = n i ) ∧ ( n i ≠ n j ), where n i and n j are distinct standard names Levesque proved that the proposed axiom is complete in the propositional case [5] . However, for the first-order case the system is shown to be incomplete by Halpern and Lakemeyer [2] .
3. The System K45*
The Modified Semantics
Rather than trying to find a complete but non-recursive axiomatization of Levesque's valid sentences, we shall attempt to axiomatize a subset of it, namely those valid in a wider class of models. We consider the same lan-guage but a more general definition of model. In order to axiomatize the largest possible set of valid sentences we shall try to keep our definition of models as close as possible to the original definition by Levesque. The main difference is that we consider an accessibility relation instead of a subset of the set of possible worlds that are accessible from every world. As in [5] and [2] , we identify a possible world with a set w ⊆ Atom of atomic sentences. However, we do not require the set of possible worlds to be the whole powerset of Atom.
The reason why an accessibility relation is used is motivated as follows. Levesque assumes K45 as the underlying logic of (implicit) belief. This logic is known to be determined by the class of all transitive and Euclidean 1 Kripke models. He notices that K45 is already determined by the class of all Kripke models (S, R, V) where R = S × S′ for some subset S′ of S. Thus, for simplifying matters, a set W of worlds is considered instead of a relation R. The relation R is implicitly understood as W0 × W, where W0 is the set of all possible worlds. However, the reduction only works when no other than basic sentences are considered: it depends on the fact that a sentence p has a K45-model if and only if it has a model where the accessibility relation can be reduced to a (subset of the) set of worlds.
The proof of this depends on the preservation of the truth value of any sentence under generated submodels (see [1] , Chapter 3.4). This preservation is not guaranteed when arbitrary sentences are allowed. Roughly speaking, the reason for the failure is this: the truth of a basic sentence in a world depends only on the truth of its subsentences in those worlds that can be reached from the current world in finitely many (including zero) steps through the accessibility relation; but this is no longer true if non-basic sentences are allowed.
Thus, we modify Levesque's definition of model as follows.
Definition 3.
Let S ⊆ W 0 be a nonempty set of "possible worlds", whose elements are sets of atomic sentences. Let R ⊆ S × S be a transitive and Euclidean binary relation on S, and w ∈ S a possible world (which can be viewed as a truth-value assignment to atomic sentences). Such a triple (S, R, w) is called a K45*-model. The sentences of OL are valuated according to the following rules:
• For any atomic P, (S, R, w) |= P iff P∈w • (S, R, w) |= (n i = n j ) iff n i is the same name as n j 
The Proof Theory
The axiom system K45* consists of the following parts: an adequate first-order basis (which handles identity and standard names properly), the K45-axioms and rules for the operator B, the K-axioms and rules for the operator N, the Barcan sentence, and the Humberstone axiom schema governing the interaction between the two operators N and B (see [4] ). (ID) (n i = n i ) ∧ (n i ≠ n j ), where n i and n j are distinct standard names. A sentence p is called a theorem of K45* if it is an axiom or can be derived from the axioms using the specified inference rules. As we only deal with the logic K45*, no confusion can occur, and we can speak simply of "theorem" instead of K45*-theorem.
Soundness and Completeness of K45*
In this section we state and prove the main technical results of the paper: the soundness and completeness of the system K45*.
Theorem 5 (Soundness).
The logic K45* is sound with respect to the class of K45*-models, i.e., every K45*-theorem is K45*-valid. Proof. We need to check that all axioms are valid in all K45*-models and the rules lead from valid sentences to valid ones. The only case that is not straightforward is (HU). Assume that there are strings S, S' of the opera-
is reachable from w in m steps if there is a sequence w 0 , ..., w m of worlds such that w = w 0 , (w i-1 , w i )∈R or (w i-1 , w i ) ∉ R for i = 1, ..., m. Then (i) there a world w m reachable from w in m steps such that (S, R, w m ) |= Bp ∧ Nq, and (ii) there exists a world w n reachable from w in n steps such that (S, R, w n ) |≠ p ∨ q. If (w m , w n ) ∈ R then from (S, R, w m ) |= Bp one can infer (S, R, w n ) |= p, otherwise (w m , w n )∉R, so from (S, R, w m ) |= Nq one can infer (S, R, w n ) |= q, both contradicting (ii). Now we are going to state and prove the completeness theorem for K45*. The completeness of K45* can be proved by extending Humberstone's method [4] to the first-order case, taking into account the restrictions on models, in particular, the special interpretations of standard names, the identification of possible worlds with sets of atomic sentences, and the requirements imposed on the accessibility relation. Our proof is based on the subordination method (see [3] ).
First, we need some auxiliary notions and results. We sometimes need to restrict our attention to a sublanguage of OL which is generated by a subset Pred' ⊆ Pred of its predicates, i.e., whose formulae are built up using only the predicates from Pred', the equality symbol, the standard names and the variables according to the standard formation rules. In particular, if p is a sentence of OL then Lp denotes the sublanguage of OL generated by the set of all predicates occurring in p. The set of atoms of Lp is denoted by Atomp.
As to derivability, it is clear that syntactic proofs are relative to a language and to a logic formulated in it. Since we consider only the logic K45*, we have to care about the language only. Let L be OL or any of its sublanguages. A set X ⊆ L is called L-consistent if there is no finite subset {p1, ..., pn} of X such that ¬(p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn) is provable. Otherwise it is said to be L-inconsistent. The set X is L-maximal consistent if it is L-consistent and every proper extension of it (within L) is L-inconsistent. Using the standard (Lindenbaum) method it can be shown that every L-consistent set can be extended to an L-maximal consistent one. The following lemma states some basic facts about maximal consistent sets.
Lemma 6. Suppose that X is L-maximal consistent. Then: (i) If p is a K45*-theorem then p∈X (ii) (p ∧ q)∈X iff p ∈ X and q ∈ X (iii) ¬p∈X iff p ∉ X (iv) ∃xp ∈ X iff p[x := c] ∈ X for some standard name c ∈ C Proof. As the proofs of (i)-(iii) are standard, they are omitted here. The statement (iv) holds for K45* because of the special interpretation of the standard names and the quantifiers, but it does not hold for arbitrary firstorder modal systems. The "if" direction of (iv) is trivial: if p[x := c] ∈ X then ∃xp ∈ X. To show the "only if" direction, assume that p[x := c] ∉ X for all names c ∈ C. Then ¬p[x := c] ∈ X for all c ∈ C, hence ∀x¬p is provable from X, by the rule (UG). Therefore ∀x¬p ∈ X, so ∃xp ∉ X.
We introduce the following abbreviations: for any set X of sentences:
• We observe that for any L-maximal consistent set X, if ¬Bp ∈ X then {¬p} ∪ B -(X) is consistent, and if ¬Np ∈ X then {¬p} ∪ N -(X) is consistent. To prove the first observation, we assume that {¬p} ∪ B -(X) were inconsistent. Then there are some q1, ..., qn such that ¬(p ∧ q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn) is provable. It follows that q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn → p is a theorem, hence Bq1 ∧ ... ∧ Bqn → Bp is also a theorem, by standard modal reasoning. As qi ∈ X for i = 1, ..., n, the sentence Bp must be in X too. But this is impossible because X is consistent. The second observation can be proved in a similar way.
Theorem 7 (Completeness).
The logic K45* is complete with respect to the class of K45*-models, that is, every K45*-valid sentence is a K45*-theorem. Proof. We need to show that if the sentence ¬p is not provable in K45* then p has a model. The model of p is constructed in several steps. First, we define a tree structure that serves as the skeleton for our model. Next, we associate to every node of the tree a maximal consistent set of sentences of a suitable language. Then we associate to every node of the tree a different possible world (i.e., set of atomic sentences). Finally, an accessibility relation is defined on that set and a suitable world is chosen to complete our model. Let Z be the set of integers and let Z* be the set of finite sequences of integers. Let <> be the empty sequence and let x, <n> denotes the concatenation of the sequence x and the sequence consisting of the single element n, i.e., if x is <mk, ..., mk> then x, <n> is <mk, ..., mk, n>. Consider the following relations R + and R -on Z*:
• x R + y iff y = x, <n> for some n ≥ 0 (n∈Z) • x R -y iff y = x, <n> for some n < 0 (n∈Z) The structure (Z*, R + , R -) can be viewed as an infinite tree with Z* as the set of nodes, the empty sequence <> as the root and (R + ∪ R -) as the set of arcs. We now build successively a model based on this tree. Let p be a sentence whose negation is not provable in K45*. Then {p} is L-consistent and can be extended to a maximal consistent set. First, we define recursively a function T on Z* that associates to every x∈Z a maximal consistent set Tx of Lp-sentences. The function T associates to the empty sequence <> ∈ Z* an Lp-maximal consistent set containing p. Now let x ∈ Z be any node in the tree structure (Z*, R + , R -). Assume that Tx has been defined, we define Tx, <n> for each successor x, <n> of x as follows. Let Sp be a surjective function from the set {x, <n> | n ≥ 0} onto the set {¬q | ¬Bq ∈ Tx}. (Such a function always exists because Tx has at most the cardinality of Z.) Then for any non-negative integer n ≥ 0, Tx, We now define K45*-model based on this labeled tree structure. To define the set of worlds we join the canonical valuation of the atomic sentences at each node with a different set of atoms not occurring in Lp. Let f : Z* → Pow(Atom\Atomp) be an one-to-one function from Z* (the set of nodes) into the powerset the set of all atoms not occurring in Lp. Such a function exists because the cardinality of the former is smaller than that of the latter. For any x ∈ Z*, the world w(x) consists of all atomic sentences occurring in Tx and all atomic sentences not occurring in Lp which are associated with x by f, that is, w(x2), i. e., the worlds correspond exactly to the elements of Z*. 2 Having the set S = {w(x) | x ∈ Z*} of possible worlds, we now move on to define the accessibility relation R ⊆ S × S. First, we include in R all pairs (w(x), w(y)) such that xR The main results about the relation R we have just constructed are the following.
Lemma 9. Let R be the relation defined above.
Proof (of Lemma 9). (i) is trivial according to our construction.
To prove (ii) let us assume that (w(x), w(y)) ∉ R. We show that if Nr ∈ Tx then r ∈ Ty. We consider two cases. To show (iii), let us assume that w(x)Rw(y) and w(y)Rw(z). Assume that Bq ∈ Tx. Because of (i) it suffices to show that q ∈ Tz. By axiom (B4), BBq ∈ Tx, thus Bq ∈ Ty and so q ∈ Tz.
Finally, let w(x)Rw(y) and w(x)Rw(z). We show that w(y)Rw(z). Assume that Bq ∈ Ty, we show that q ∈ Tz. Suppose that this is not the case, then ¬q ∈ Tz, so ¬Bq ∈ Tx. With (B5) we can infer B¬Bq ∈ Tx, so ¬Bq ∈ Ty, contradicting our assumption that Bq ∈ Ty. Thus, we have proved that R is Euclidean.
The last step to prove our completeness theorem is the following lemma:
Lemma 10. Let S = {w(x) | x ∈ Z*} and R ⊆ S × S be the relation defined above. For all worlds w(x) ∈ S and all formulae q ∈ L p , (S, R, w(x)) |= q if and only if q ∈ T x . Proof (Lemma 10). We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of sentences.
If q ∈ Atomp then q ∈ Tx iff q ∈ w(x), by the definition of w(x), hence q ∈ Tx iff (S, R, w(x)) |= q.
If q is ¬r then (S, R, w(x)) |= q iff (S, R, w(x)) |≠ r iff r ∉ Tx (by induction hypothesis) iff ¬r ∈ Tx (by Lp-maximal consistency of Tx and Lemma 6) iff q ∈ Tx.
Assume that q is (r ∧ s). Then (S, R, w(x)) |= q iff (S, R, w(x)) |= r and (S, R, w(x)) |= s iff r ∈ Tx and s ∈ Tx (by induction hypothesis) iff (r ∧ s) ∈ Tx (by Lp-maximal consistency of Tx and Lemma 6) iff q ∈ Tx.
Let q be ∃xr. In this case (S, R, w(x)) |= q iff (S, R, w(x)) |= r[x := c] for some standard name c ∈ C iff r[x := c] ∈ Tx iff r[x := c] ∈ Tx (by induction hypothesis) iff ∃xr ∈ Tx (by Lp-maximal consistency of Tx and Lemma 6) iff q ∈ Tx. Now assume that q is Br. For all w(y) ∈ S, if Br ∈ Tx and w(x)Rw(y) then r ∈ Ty, by Lemma 9(i). By induction hypothesis (S, R, w(y)) |= r, so (S, R, w(x)) |= Br, i.e., (S, R, w(x)) |= q. Conversely, if Br ∉ Tx then ¬Br ∈ Tx, hence ¬r ∈ Ty for some y such that xR Finally, let q be Nr. For all w(y) ∈ S, if Nr ∈ Tx and (w(x), w(y)) ∉ R then r ∈ Ty, by Lemma 9(ii). By induction hypothesis (S, R, w(y)) |= r, so (S, R, w(x)) |= Nr, i.e., (S, R, w(x)) |= q. Conversely, if Nr ∉ Tx then ¬Nr ∈ Tx, hence ¬r ∈ Ty for some y such that xR -y, according to Lemma 8, so r ∉ Ty. By induction hypothesis, (S, R, w(y)) |≠ r. But from xR -y it follows that (w(x), w(y)) ∉ R, so (S, R, w(y)) |≠ Nr.
From Lemma 10 we can infer (S, R, w(<n>)) |= p, because p ∈ T<>. Thus, every K45*-valid sentence is provable in K45*.
Conclusion
We have defined a subsystem of Levesque's logic of only-knowing and prove its completeness. Our logic is obtained by dropping some of Levesque's restrictions on models, thus allowing a larger class of models. Its axiomatization is obtained by adding an axiom schema of Humberstone to a subset of the set of Levesque's axioms. The main completeness result is obtained using the subordination technique, combined with some tricks to take care of the restrictions imposed on models. The tricks are necessary because we try to modify Levesque's definition of models as little as possible.
As the works of Levesque [5] and Halpern and Lakemeyer [2] show, the interaction of the operators B and N is very subtle, which makes a complete axiomatization of the original logic of only-knowing very hard to find. Instead of trying to capture this interaction "in one go" with a single (non-recursive) axiom schema (in the style of Levesque's N versus B axiom), we try to axiomatize only parts of this interaction using a recursive axiom system. The obvious question to be asked now is: which (nonrecursive) axioms must be added to K45* in order to yield a complete axiom system for Levesque's logic? We leave this question for future investigation.
